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Long-Run Effects of Public-Private Research Joint Ventures: 
The Case of the Danish Innovation Consortia Support Scheme
* 
 
Subsidized research joint ventures (RJVs) between public research institutions and industry 
have become increasingly popular in Europe and the US. We study the long-run effects of 
such a support scheme that has been maintained by the Danish government since 1995. To 
cope with identification problems we apply nearest neighbor caliper matching and conditional 
difference-in-difference estimation methods. Our main findings are that (i) program 
participation effects are instant for annual patent applications and last for three years, (ii) 
employment effects materialize first after one year and (iii) there are no statistically significant 
effects on value added or labor productivity. We further show that these overall results are 
primarily driven by firms that were patent active prior to joining the RJV and that there are no 
statistically significant effect for large firms. Both types of firms are disproportionally 
represented in the support program we study. 
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Governments all over the world try to stimulate industrial research expenditures
through research subsidies. The economic rationale behind such eorts is that the
social value of R&D, mainly due to the existence of research spillovers, lies below its
private return | rms are unable to fully appropriate the benets from their R&D
eorts. This external eect leads to under{investment in R&D from a social point
of view and thereby justify governmental intervention (D'Aspremont and Jacquemin
1998; Kaiser 2002a; Kamien et al. 1992; Kamien and Zang 2000; Katz 1986; Leahy
and Neary 1997; Spence 1984; Suzumura 1992).
Research subsidies come in two main forms, tax breaks and direct subsidies for
specic research projects. The economic eciency of such schedules in terms of their
eects on private R&D has been extensively discussed in a special issue on technology
policy in Research Policy in 2000 with a positive verdict about tax incentives and with
somewhat inconclusive results with respect to research subsidies.
Research subsidies are, however, not the only measure governments use to stimulate
innovation. In the mid{1980s policy makers in the EU and the US started to permit
Research Joint Ventures (RJVs), where RJV members pool their research resources to
generate inventions (Kaiser 2002b). Spillovers are internalized within a joint venture
so that private and social returns to R&D are equated. Such cooperations where
hitherto deemed anti{competitive. After they had been legalized, RJVs have become
increasingly popular (Caloghirou et al. 2003a) and constitute the dominant form of
research cooperation today (Hagedoorn 2002).
An additional means of research stimulation that has received much attention by
policy makers and economists alike is the technology transfer between public sector
research institutions and industry. These may take on the form of formal and informal
public{private R&D collaborations as well as of university spinos and licensing.1
While the literature has so far well studied RJVs, research subsidies and public{
private R&D cooperation, comparatively little is known about the eects of subsidized
public{private research cooperations where the partners involved in the RJV receive
subsidies on their R&D expenditures that accrue within the RJV. These \hybrid"
forms of RJV and subsidies have spread substantially both in the US (Vonortas 1999,
2000) and in Europe (Caloghirou et al. 2003a) where e.g. the \Cooperation" program
within the 7th EU Framework Programme requires participation of both public and
private institutions.
1Another relevant but more indirect form of research partnership, technology transfer oces, has been established
in the wake of the Bayh{Dole act of 1980. A special issue of Research Policy had been devoted to economic analyzes
of that change in legislature (Grimaldi et al. 2011).
1In this paper we study a particular subsidized public/private RJV program, the
\Danish Innovation Consortia" (DIC), and its eects on the performance of the par-
ticipating industrial rms. The DIC program was started in 1995 with the intention to
strengthen the technology transfer between public research institutions and industry.
It includes private sector entities and public research institutions. Our data trace the
period 1990 to 2007. Within that period, the program covered 80 DICs and included
220 unique rms. The total grant volume in 2002, which is the year the last DIC in
our data started, was 766 mio. DKK (about 100 mio. Euros).
A unique feature of our data is that they trace a comparably long time period
which enables us to investigate the long{term eects of subsidized RJV participation
on rm performance. In particular, we study both contemporaneous eects as well as
the eect of DIC membership with a ve years lag. We account for contemporaneous
eects since Hall et al. (1986) demonstrate that R&D eects on patent counts appear
to be contemporaneous and we consider lags of up to ve years since Peterson (1993),
using business survey data for the European EUREKA publicly sponsored joint re-
search program, nds that up to ve years lapse until EUREKA eects materialize.
Related studies by Bayona{S aez and Garc a{Marco (2010), Benfratello and Sembenelli
(2002) as well as Brandstetter and Sakakibara (2002) have considered two year lags.
Bayona{S aez and Garc a{Marco (2010) study the EUREKA program using dynamic
panel data technique and nd a positive eect of program participation on return on
assets that, however, materializes only one year after project completion. Benfratello
and Sembenelli (2002) apply dierences in means tests to show that participation in
the EUREKA program has positive eects on labor productivity and price cost mar-
gins while participation in the less market oriented EU framework program FPST
is not signicantly related to these success parameters. Brandstetter and Sakakibara
(2002) study Japanese research consortia and nd that program participation has more
positive eects if is geared towards more basic research and that they appear rst one
year after project completion.
We link the instance of program participants to rm{level data, essentially balance
sheet information before and after DIC participation, to control for a wide range of
variables that aect program participation choice and/or rm performance. We use
multi{dimensional measures of rm performance, namely growth in patent stock (i.e.
the number of patent applications) as a \direct" measure | the DICs are geared
towards \high quality research" | as well as two more indirect and frequently used
measures, namely employment growth and growth in value added (which we deate
to account for ination).
What performance measure to use is a debated issue in the literature (Caloghirou
2et al. 2003a). Most studies investigate innovative inputs to investigate whether public
subsidies or RJVs crowd in or crowd out private R&D. With the exception of Wallsten
(2000), who provides evidence for crowing out for research subsidies, the existing
literature tends to either nd insignicant or positive eects for such support schemes
(Almus and Czarnitzki 2003; Girma et al. 2007; Gonz alez and Paz o 2008; Klette et
al. 2000; Lach 2002). Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998), Irwin and Klenow (1996)
as well as Kaiser (2002b) nd positive eects of RJV participation on private R&D
spending.
Existing research has also studied the relationship between subsidization and inno-
vative outputs (Archibald and Finifter 1999; Benfratello and Sembellini 2002; Branstet-
ter and Sakakibara 1998; George et al. 2002; Huggins 2001; Kogut 1988; Lar edo 1998;
Klette and Men 1999), nding positive or statistically insignicant eects. In this pa-
per we consider the number of patent applications per year as a measure of innovative
output. We do not, however, observe any measure of innovative input.
Yet another strand of the literature has studied rm performance eect of subsi-
dies and research joint ventures. We follow that strand by considering value added
and employment growth as our more indirect performance eects of DIC member-
ship. Prot{related variables have previously been considered by Bayona-S aez and
Garc a{Marco (2010), Berg et al. (1982), Hagedoorn and Schakenrad (1994) as well
as Siebert (1996). These studies tend to nd positive eects of governmental interven-
tion. Employment growth has been analyzed by Wallsten (2000) who does not nd
any signicant eects.2
Program participation is non{random and participation choice may well be corre-
lated with rm performance and innovative output. Since rms are either observed as
program participants or non{participants, we are faced with an identication problem.
Our attempt to getting around that issue is to apply \conditional dierences in dier-
ences" (cDID) estimation methods (Heckman et al. 1998, 1999) where we rst match
participating and and non{participating rms with respect to observed rm{specic
characteristics before joining a DIC and then run rm performance regression models
on the matched data set (hence the term \conditional dierence-in-dierence"). The
idea behind running parametric regression on the matched treatment/control data is
to remove any dierences in the observable characteristics between both groups. Such
an approach has been previously applied for research subsidization programs by Almus
and Czarnitzki (2003) as well as by Brandstetter and Sakakibara (1998). The latter
do, however, not apply formal matching models but compare what they term \roughly
similar" rms instead. Our approach identies causal eects of treatment conditional
2Other author have analyzed productivity (Benfratello and Sembenelli 2002; Sissoko 2011), R&D eciency (Link
1998a,b) as well as subjective performance measures (Caloghirou et al. 2003b; Caloghirou and Vonortas 2000).
3on observables (i.e. the explanatory variables we do control for) and on time{invariant
rm{specic eects and time trends. That is to say, we do not identify causal eects
if we omit time{variant variables that aect both selection into treatment and our
outcome measures, at least to the extent that these are not highly correlated with the
variables we do control for.
Our main results are as follows: in the specications that allow for contempo-
raneous eects only we nd statistically and economically signicant eects of DIC
participation on annual patent applications: DIC membership increases the number
of annual patents by 0.39 percent, a gure that needs to be related to a mean number
of annual patent application of 0.59. This nding is primarily driven by rms that
applied for a patent prior to joining a DIC. We do not nd any statistically signicant
contemporaneuos eects of program participation on the other outcome variables we
consider, employment and value added.
In the specication where we do allow for both contemporaneous and lagged eects
we nd that DIC participation not only positively aects patent counts contempora-
neously but with lags of one, two and three years as well. The total eect of DIC
membership on patent counts after three years is 1.62 and measured with high pre-
cision. We again nd that the positive eects are mainly due to rms that already
innovated prior to joining a DIC. By contrast, we do not document any statistically
signicant eects for the 25 percent largest rms. The latter nding appears to be
particularly relevant since program participation is statistically signicantly positive
aected by rm size which hence indicates that granting agencies may want to shift
attention to smaller rms instead. That issue had been raised by Link and Rees (1990)
already.3 By contrast, our nding that the positive eects on patent counts are mainly
driven by rms that patented prior to joining a DIC is policy{reassuring since program
participation is positively aected by previous patenting activity as well.
For employment growth as our outcome variable we show that program partic-
ipation is associated with an increase in the number of employees by 0.03 percent
after one year, an eect that is statistically weakly signicant. The eect is more
than twice as large and measured with much more precision for previously patent{
active rms. Moreover, the total eect of treatment on employment growth for rms
patent active prior to treatment is largest after four years where it is 0.16 percent
and statistically signicant. Sizeable employment eects hence kick in with substan-
tial delay only which in turn implies that studies that consider shorter time horizons
may underestimate the true long{run eects of program participation, an issue that
may explain why Wallsten (2000) does not nd any statistically signicant impact of
3See Pavitt (1998) for a general critical appraisal of EU R&D policies.
4program participation.
Finally, we do not nd any statistically signicant results of DIC participation on
deated value added. We have additionally considered labor productivity, dened as
the natural logarithm of value added relative to total employment and did not nd
any statistically signicant eects either. This is in accordance with Benfratello and
Sembellini's (2002) ndings for the FPST program but contrast their results for the
EUREKA program regarding labor productivity.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 characterizes the DICs, Section 3
outlines our empirical approach, Section 4 describes our data, Section 5 details our
empirical specication, Section 6 provides descriptive statistics, Section 7 discusses
our estimation results and Section 8 concludes.
2 The Danish Innovation Consortia
The Danish Innovation Consortium program was started in 1995 and is administered
by the Danish Agency for Science, Technology and Innovation (DASTI) under the
Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation.
An innovation consortium consists of at least two partners that participate through-
out the entire project, at least one research institution and one of the Danish \Ap-
proved Technological Service Institutes" (ATS) which are research and technology
organizations similar to the Fraunhofer Gesellschaft in Germany, France's Alternative
Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) or SINTEF in Norway.4 Within the
DICs the ATS' assume advisory and coordinating roles. DIC projects have life-spans
of between two to ve years with a mean and median duration of 3.5 years.
Between two and ve rms participate in a given DIC. While DASTI does not re-
imburse rms' expenses associated with project participation, it nances the expenses
incurred by the research and the technological service institutions. Total grants sizes
for DICs are between 0.9 mio. and 15 mio. DKK (between 100,000 and two mio.
Euros).
To be eligible for funding DASTI requires a set of conditions to be met: the joint
project should result in the completion of high{quality research relevant to Danish
companies, have generic content and require close collaboration between the consor-
4The respective URLs of these institutions are http://www.fraunhofer.de/en/index.jsp,
http://www.cea.fr/english portal and http://www.sintef.no/home/. There exists no direct counter-
part in the US. There are, however, similar knowledge transfer functions that are delivered by a
number of independent engineering research institutes. A short description of the ATS' is avail-
able for download from http://www.teknologiportalen.dk/NR/rdonlyres/C63A9F7F-579D-475D-9D35-
BFE66CBC0F49/4160/117397 infofolderUK 21x21 low.pdf
5tium parties. Yet, it is not supposed to have the character of product development
for individual companies, e.g. it is not contract research. Examples of development
projects include improving laser beam welding, e{learning, or fermentation technolo-
gies.
The DIC program is, like the FPST program and unlike the EUREKA program
(Benfratello and Sembellini 2002), more research than market oriented.
Six rms have participated in more than one consortia. It would be interesting to
study dierential eects of having joined more than one research consortium but the
low number of repeated participations prohibits further investigation. Benfratello and
Sembellini (2002) study additivity eects of multiple EUREKA and FPST program
participation.
Section 6 presents and discusses descriptive statistics of the rms involved in the
DICs and our control group of non{DIC member rms.
3 Empirical approach
The main question this paper asks is: what is the causal eect of DIC membership
(e.g. treatment received) on those rms that did join a DIC? In other words, what is
the dierence between rm i that did receive treatment and the same rm i that did
not receive treatment. The fundamental problem is that rm i is only observed in one
state, with treatment or without treatment. The counterfactual is not observed.
Constructing a valid counterfactual is the key to the estimation of any treatment
eect. There is a growing body of literature that is based on the counterfactual
framework that was pioneered by Rubin (1974). Blundell and Costa Dias (2005) as
well as Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) provide excellent review articles. A particularly
often used workhorse applied in the program evaluation literature is the econometric
matching model, and we shall use such an approach in this paper as well.
The panel structure of our data set allows us to combine matching models and
regression models. That way we are able to take into account both observable and
unobservable factors | at least to the extent that they are time-invariant and linear |
that may drive selection into treatment (and that may be correlated with the outcome
variables).
In a rst step we match control group rms to the rms that have been a member
of a DIC. In a second step, we regress our outcome variables on a set of conditioning
variables and treatment indicator variables. We observe both treatment and control
observations before and after treatment so we eectively combine propensity score
matching with dierence-in-dierence estimation (i.e. cDID estimation) as discussed
by Blundell and Costa Dias (2008, Ch. E).
6All estimations are performed using Stata 11.0. We use the \psmatch2" module
by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) implemented in Stata to perform our propensity score
matching estimations.
3.1 Propensity score matching
Basics
The basic idea behind matching methods is to remove all dierences between partici-
pating and non{participating by nding \twins" (in terms of observed characteristics)
of the participating rms in the universe of non{participants. We then go a step
further by removing all dierences that may remain by parametric performance re-
gressions in rst dierences. It is important to note that we do not need to remove
all observable dierences in the observable characteristics by matching already since
we apply parametric regressions on the match treatment/control data (Heckman et
al. 1998). These regressions control for both rm-specic unobserved factors (\xed
eects") as well as for rm{specic time trends (see Subsection 2.2). We hence at-
tempt to identifying causal eects under the weakest possible assumptions and we
even achieve identication in the absence of perfect equality of the characteristics of
treatment and control observations. Conditional on our choice of control variables and
on treatment and control observations not following dierent time trends we obtain
an unbiased estimator of the program participation eect (Blundell and Costa Dias
2009; Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008).
There are two basic types of matching methods, nearest neighbor matching which
minimizes the distances between the observed characteristics of two dierent observa-
tions based on some distance measure and propensity score matching. We refer to the
latter method since nearest neighbor matching can quickly lead to problems with the
\curse of dimensionality", i.e., diculties associated with nding control rms which
are highly similar in more than just a few dimensions.
Propensity score matching condensates the distance in observed characteristics be-
tween two dierent rms in one measure, the propensity score.5 We estimate the
propensity score based on a binary probit model estimation for the probability of re-
ceiving treatment in a particular year t + 1, i.e. we match rms according to their
observable characteristics prior to joining a DIC. If we matched rms on their observ-
able characteristics contemporaneously, these characteristics may have been aected
by DIC membership already which in turn leads to a violation of the \unconfounded-
5Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest using such \balancing scores". They show that if potential outcomes are
independent of treatment conditional on observed characteristics (which we assume), they are also independent of
treatment conditional on a balancing score.
7ness" or \conditional independence" assumption underlying matching methods (Blun-
dell and Costa Dias 2009; Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008).
The validity of the conditional independence assumption to a large extent depends
on the way the outcome variables in the parametric regression models to follow are
dened. In our case, we consider changes in outcomes instead of levels and control
for rm-specic growth trends in the regressions and for time{invariant rm{specic
eects, which considerably reduces the likelihood of the conditional independence as-
sumption to be invalid.
Our approach to minimize any bias arising from non{random assignment into treat-
ment is to assume that, given a set of observable characteristics | which is aected by
treatment | potential outcomes are independent of the assignment to treatment. This
assumes that selection is based on observable characteristics only and that all variables
that inuence treatment assignment and potential outcomes are simultaneously part
of our conditioning variables.
While we do control for a large set of relevant variables that are known to aect
both rm performance and selection, we cannot formally test if the conditional in-
dependence assumption is indeed satised. We do, however, formally test whether
treatment and control observations no longer dier signicantly with respect to ob-
servable characteristics after matching. This is known as the \balancing property".
An additional condition for our identication strategy to hold is the \common
support" requirement. It rules out that the probability of treatment is perfectly pre-
dicted by the set of conditioning variables. It makes sure that individuals with the
same observed characteristics have a positive probability of receiving both treatment
and non{treatment (Heckman et al. 1999). Anticipating our estimation results we
note that all our matched control observations are on the common support.
There exists a multitude of econometric matching models of which Blundell and
Costa Dias (2009) as well as Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) provide reviews. These
methods have in common that they trade bias (which is an increasing function of the
dissimilarities of treatments and controls) against precision (which is an increasing
function of the size of the control group). Our goal is to minimize bias since the
results of the matching procedure are not of original interest to us. We hence resort to
nearest neighbor caliper matching with a single neighbor and replacement as suggested
by Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008).
3.2 Conditional dierences{in{dierences estimation
With a sample of treatment and observationally highly similar control observations at
hand we run multivariate regressions on our three outcome variables patent stock, the
8number of employees and value added.
Employment and value added
We assume that the data generating process for our outcome variables number of
employees (Yeit) and value added (Yit), is log{linear:
Ykit = exp(Xkitk + ki + kit + kDit + kit); (1)
where k = e; (employment and value added respectively) and i denotes a time-
invariant rm-specic error component, i denotes rm-specic time trends, Dit de-
notes a dummy variable for rm i having received treatment at time t and it denotes
an idiosyncratic error term.
We take logs and rst dierence Equation (1) to remove the time-invariant rm-
specic error component, i, and to be able to estimate the parameters corresponding
to the rm{specic time trends, i, leads to the following estimating equation:
ln(Ykit) = (Xkit   Xkit 1)e + ki + k(Dit   Dit 1) + kit   kit 1: (2)
We estimate Equation (2) by linear xed eects. These xed eects represent the
coecient of rm{specic time trends, i.6 The coecient of interest is  which is
to be interpreted as the percentage change in employment and value added caused by
DIC membership respectively.
Taking logs of Equation (1) generates missing values for value added as dependent
variable since value added can become negative. This is, however, the case for less
than one percent of the observations only which is why we ignore this issue.
Patent stock
Patent stock as our third outcome variable does not lend itself to a log{linear speci-
cation since the patent stock of most rms is 0. We assume a simple linear functional
form and take rst dierences instead:
Ypit = (Xpit   Xit 1)p + pi + p(Dit   Dit 1) + pit   pit 1: (3)
Our dependent variable is the number of patent applications by rm i at time t (the
dierence in patent stocks between t and t   1). It is a count variable and we hence
estimate Equation (3) using count data models. The term pi again represents the
coecients related to rm{specic time trends. The coecient of interest again is 
which measures the percentage change in the number of patents due to DIC member-
ship.
To estimate that equation, we follow Blundell et al. (1995, 1999, 2002) and take
into account both state dependence and time{invariant rm{specic eects. State
6Note that this actually is a Dierence{in{Dierence{in{Dierence estimation since the time{invariant error
component (after rst dierencing), ei, could be removed by taking rst dierences again.
9dependence has proven to be an important feature of innovative activity (Blundell et
al. 1995, 1999, 2002; Ejsing et al. 2011; Kaiser et al. 2011; Peters 2009).
The idea behind the Blundell et al. (1995, 1999, 2002) model is to approximate
the time{invariant rm{specic eects (e.g. the \correlated eects"), by the number
of \pre{sample" patents, e.g. in our case a rms' patent stock prior to 1990, the
year when our rm{level data begins (while our patent data go back until 1978).
We operationalize that variable following Blundell et al. (1995, 1999) by the natural
logarithm of rm i's patent stock in 1990. In case the patent stock is zero, we replace
the corresponding natural logarithm by 0. We additionally include a dummy variable
for rm i' patent stock in 1990 being positive to account for the nonlinearity we
introduce by our substitution. Our correction for the clustering at 0 counts should
perform better than \Zero Ination" (Mullahy 1986) models since it is based on much
less restrictive assumptions (Kaiser et al. 2011; Staub and Winkelmann 2009). Our
measure of state dependence is lagged patent stock (which is a linear function of lagged
patent applications).
4 Data
Information on the DICs was collected by DASTI and was made available for research
through the Centre for Economic and Business Research at Copenhagen Business
School. These data were merged with balance sheet information supplied by Experian,
a global provider of business intelligence. These data have been previously used by
i.a. Nielsen et al. (2007). A Pan{european counterpart of the Experian data has
been used by Hern an et al. (2003) to study the determinants of EUREKA program
participation.
We complement our DIC/KOB data by information on all patent applications to
the European Patent Oce (EPO) that were led for between 1978 and 2006 by
at least one applicant with Danish residence. We retrieved that data from EPO's
\PATSTAT" database.7 We consider patent applications up to and including 2004 in
our analysis, since the database for the years following this date is not complete. It
includes 12,873 patent applications in total. The patent data have been previously
been used by Ejsing et al. (2011) as well as Kaiser et al. (2011).
Patent applications are used rather than patent grants because the average grant
time at the EPO of four to ve years for Danish applications (Kaiser and Schneider,
2005) implies that a substantial number of patents applied for during the time pe-
riod considered for estimation (1990{2004) would be lost if patent grants were used
7For information about this data set, refer to http://www.epo.org/patents/patent-information/raw-
data/test/product-14-24.html.
10instead.8 The \time stamp" of the patent applications is the \priority date", the date
on which the invention was rst led for patent protection at the EPO or any national
patent oce.
Before matching we remove observations belonging to regions and three digits
NACE Rev. I sectors that never received treatment. We also discard rms which
do not have employees, have zero value added and for which information on value
added or employees is missing.
Value added as our only monetary variable is deated by the year 2000 consumer
price index.
Our combined data set that we use for our propensity score estimations contains
193,037 observations on 27,798 unique rms. The nal data set we use for our cDID
estimations includes 4,549 observations on 217 unique DIC member rms and 173
unique control group rms. The discrepancy between the unique number of treatment
and control group rms is due to us matching with replacement (which increases
ineciency but decreases bias).
5 Empirical specication
5.1 Conditioning variables for propensity score matching
The conditioning variables we take into account for our propensity score matching are
standard in the literature: rm size as measured by the natural logarithm of the total
number of employees (Fritsch and Lukas 2001; Gonz ales and Paz o 2008, Hern an et
al. 2003; Link and Rees 1990; Tether 2002; Wallsten 2000) and its square, rm age
(Gonz ales and Paz o 2008) as well as the Hirshman-Herndahl concentration index to
account for competitive pressure (Hern an et al. 2003).9
Like Hern an et al. (2003) we control for the speed at which innovation diuses to
competitors by using the survey data of Manseld (1985) at the two and (where avail-
able) three digit NACE sectoral classication level and the self{reported eectiveness
of patent protection taken from Levin et al. (1987), again at the two and three digit
NACE sectoral classication level. Both variables are measures of R&D spillovers
which have been shown to aect RJV formation (Belderbos et al. 2004; Caloghirou et
al. 2003a; Cassiman and Veugelers 2002; Hern an et al. 2003; Kaiser 2002b).
Since granting authorities are likely to base access to subsidized research on prior
innovation performance we also include the lagged number of patents in our treatment
8There exists a reporting lag between the date of application and the date on which the application is published
in the EPO database. This implies that not all patents applied for after 2004 are registered in the database at the
time of data collection. We do not include such patents in order to avoid biases.
9We calculate that index as the sum of squared sales shares at the three digit NACE level.
11regression. We operationalize that variable as its natural logarithm and follow Kaiser
et al. (2011) and replace the missing values generated by the logarithmization by 0
and additionally include a dummy variable that is coded 1 if the corresponding rms
has a positive patent stock (and 0 otherwise). This is the same procedure as for the
correlated eects proxy variables discussed in Subsection 3.2. We nally include the
usual rm heterogeneity control variables like sector aliation, regional aliation,
legal form dummies as well as year dummies.
We do control for all variables that may aect RJV formation and/or rm perfor-
mance and that are available in our data. We do, however, not control for many other
variables that may prove to be important and which are reviewed by Caloghouri et
al. (2003a). We for example do not control for previous RJV experience (Hern an
et al. 2003; Vonortas 1997), absorptive capacity (Cassiman and Veugelers 2002;
Kaiser 2002b; Kogut 1991); access to complementary knowledge (Cohen et al. 1997;
Caloghouri et al. 2003a; Katsoulacos and Ulph 1988); sectoral R&D (Hern an et al.
2003) and strategic motives to join a RJV (Link 1990; Link and Bauer 1989; Link and
Zmund 1984; Martin 1996; Vonortas 1997). These unobserved motives may well aect
DIC participation and our outcome measures. Note, however, that these factors are
accounted for | at least to the extent that they are time{invariant | in our \second
stage" dierence{in{dierence estimation.
5.2 Conditioning variables for conditional Dierence{in{dierence
estimation
The conditioning variables for our cDID regressions dier between the performance
variables we consider. The Hirshman-Herndahl index of sales concentration, a set
of year dummies and treatment dummies are considered in all specications. Patent
eectiveness, time until an innovation is diused, regional aliation and sectoral af-
liation are time{invariant and drop out from our rst dierence estimations.
Our specication for patent stock includes the proxy variables for correlated eects
| the dummy variable for having applied for a patent prior to 1990 and the log
number of patents prior to 1990 | as well as our dummy variable for state dependence
as explained above and the natural logarithm of the number of employees. The latter
variable is also included in our model for value added.
5.3 Short{run and long{eects
We have so far only considered contemporaneous eects of DIC membership. We
do also, however, allow for DIC eects to inuence rm performance with lags. Our
extended treatment term which accounts for ve lags is
P5
l=0 l(Dit l Dit l 1) (which
12we substitute for (Dit   Dit 1) in Equation (2)). The total eect of treatment at




We start our empirical analysis by presenting descriptive statistics of our dependent
variables in Table 1. The table dierentiates between treatment group and control
group observations. The table and our estimations discard observations with the one
percent smallest and the 1 percent largest values in the outcomes variables employment
and value added to avoid our results being driven by outliers. Table 1 only refers to the
key variables involved in our estimations. Appendix A displays descriptive statistics
of all variables involved in our estimations. It also distinguishes between large and
innovative rms before treatment since we estimate treatment eects separately for
large and innovative rms. Appendix B displays rm size distributions by sector.
Both appendices and Table 1 refer to our data before propensity score matching.
The average rm in our data employs 13.5 workers, possesses a discounted patent
stock of 0.008 patents (we discount the stock of patents by 30 percent per year following
Blundell et al. 1995), applies for 0.006 patents per year and makes average annual
value added of 57,600 DKK per year. It is twelve years old, incorporated with a
Herndahl{index of sales concentration of 0.068, i.e. it operates in unconcentrated
markets.
DIC and non{DIC members dier substantially with respect to the number of
patents, employment and value added. DIC member rms are substantially larger (576
employees on average compared to 13 employees for non{DIC rms), patent more often
(patent stock of 1.29 compared to 0.007) and make higher annual value added (531,906
DKK compared to 57,010 DKK). Looking at these gures alone would suggest that
DIC treatment has positive eects on the participating rms. Such an assessment
would ignore, however, the fundamental heterogeneity among rms in a DIC and
outside a DIC. Our econometric approach is to remove all observable heterogeneity to
assess the causal eect of DIC participation.
Turning to our explanatory variables we note that DIC member rms are older,
are more likely to be stock listed, are less likely to be privately held companies and
operate in much less concentrated markets. There are no signicant dierences with
respect to our spillover variables (which only vary across sectors).
137 Estimation results
7.1 Propensity score estimation
Probit estimation results
Our econometric analysis starts with the estimation of a binary probit model for
receiving treatment at t + 1, i.e., we condition the probability of receiving treatment
conditional on variables observed at t.
Table 2 displays our estimation results. It shows that rms with prior patenting
activity and larger rms have a higher chance of participating in a DIC than small and
non{patenting rms. Indeed, the eect of rms size seems U{shaped, the minimum
is, however, reached at a number of employees of 0.18 which is outside the range of
our data. There are also statistically jointly signicant dierences in legal form, sector
and regional aliation as well as in the year dummy variables.
The specication displayed in Table 2 did not balance well on patent stock. To
improve our match on patent stock we also include squared patent stock in our nal
probit specication (not shown in the results table).
Match quality
Given that we do not condition individually on all variables in our set of conditioning
variables, but on the propensity score instead, we need to assess if our matching
approach is able to balance the distribution of treatment and control individuals, i.e.,
if the match quality is satisfactory.
We follow a suggestion by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) and use \standardized
biases", which simply constitute the dierences between treatment and control group
observations in the means of the conditioning variables before and after matching,
weighted by their standard deviations. Appendix C displays standardized biases before
and after matching for all explanatory variable we consider. It shows that none of the
dierences in the observed variables is statistically signicant. Indeed, post matching
dierences are very small and p{values post matching are all well above 0.2.
We would like to stress that we match particularly well on the number of employees
and patent stock. The respective p{values for dierences in the treatment and the
control group are 0.711 and 0.925 (see Appendix C). This is important to note since we
shall conduct dierential regressions for large rms and rms with patenting activity
prior to having received treatment.
As an additional informal matching quality check, Sianesi (2004) suggests re-
estimating the propensity score on the matched sample, i.e., only including the treat-
ment individuals and the matched control group observations, and compare the pseudo
R2's before and after matching. There should not exist a signicant dierence in the
14distribution of covariates after matching and the pseudo R2's should therefore be close
to 0. In addition, tests for joint signicance of the covariates should reject joint sig-
nicance after matching. The pseudo R2 after matching is 0.032 and tests for joint
signicance easily reject the ability of the covariates to explain selection after match-
ing as well (p{value .98). We hence conclude that our control group is satisfactorily
matched to our treatment group based on observed rm characteristics.
Such a satisfactory match is not even necessary for an unbiased estimation of
treatment eects as we condition on the same set of explanatory variables in the
regression models as well. Moreover, our dierence{in{dierence specication also
accounts for time{invariant rm{specic eects as well as for rm{specic time trends.
7.2 Dierence{in{dierence estimation
With the matched treatment/control group data at hand we now run count data
models for patent applications as our outcome variable and linear xed eects models
for employment and value added as outcome variables.
We rst discuss our results for the specication that does not allow for lagged
eects and then turn to our specication that considers lag lengths of between one
and ve.
Contemporaneous eects
Table 3 displays our estimation results for the contemporaneous eects of treatment,
e.g. we do not consider lagged eects here. We nd that DIC members apply for
0.387 percent more patents than non{DIC members, controlled for observable and
unobservable dierences between rms. There are no statistically signicant dier-
ences between innovative rms (rms with at least one patent prior to treatment) and
non{innovative rms. We do nd, however, that the treatment eect is statistically
insignicant for large rms, e.g. the 25 percent largest rms in our data. That indi-
cates that DIC membership is most eective for smaller rms rms. This nding may
of course be partly driven by the greater heterogeneity among large rms in our data.
That DIC participation has a contemporaneous eect on patent counts may seem
surprising since patents are unlikely generated instantaneously despite similar ndings
in an early study by Hall et al. (1986). We speculate that research that leads to a
patent application shortly after a DIC was joined has been \in the pipeline" already,
possibly by the public research partner with its stronger focus on publication rather
than on patenting. Research cooperation with industrial partners within the DIC may
have triggered the eventual patent application for the invention.
For the more \indirect" performance measures employment and value added we
do not nd any statistically signicant contemporaneous treatment eects, neither for
15innovative rms nor for large rms. We also ran labor productivity regressions that
did not indicate any statistically signicant eects of program participation. We do
not display these results for brevity. These results are consistent with Benfratello and
Sembellini for the FPST program but contrast Bayona{S aez and Garci a{Marco (2010)
who nd that EUREKA program participation positively aects return on investment
one year after the program was joined.
Lagged eects
We expect treatment eects to materialize with some lag after joining a DIC, especially
when it comes to our more \indirect" performance measures employment and value
added. We therefore additionally consider a specication where we allow for ve lags
as discussed in Subsection 5.3. Table 4 displays our corresponding estimation results.
We again nd statistically and economically signicant results of treatment on the
number of patent applications. The contemporaneous eect is 0.44 percent and hence
somewhat larger than when lagged eects are not considered. The coecient estimates
for the rst to third lag are statistically signicant as well with point estimates between
0.35 and 0.44. The fourth coecient is weakly signicant and negative which we
attribute to noise, in particular when noticing that the coecient is estimated with
little precision and that the fth lag is statistically insignicant and again positive.
Table 5.3 suggests that these positive eects are primarily due to rms that patented
prior to joining a DIC | the coecient estimates are similar to the ones obtained for
the gross sample and we attribute their lower signicance to the substantial reduction
in the number of observations.
We do not nd statistically signicant results for large rms which reinforces our
previous result that DIC membership is more ecient for smaller rms.
While we did not nd any statistically signicant eects of treatment on contem-
poraneous employment we do, however, document statistically signicant and positive
employment eects that materialize one year after having joined a DIC. The related
coecient translates into a percentage change in employment of 0.025 percent. This
eect is larger for innovative rms (0.057 percent). For innovative rms we also nd
statistically signicant and positive eects at lag four. We do not establish a statis-
tically signicant mapping between large or small rms with respect to employment
growth except for the fth lag which is negative but marginally signicant only.
In addition, we do not nd statistically signicant eects of DIC participation on
value added for either all rms, innovative rms or large rms. One exception is a
statistically marginally signicant point estimate of -0.056 percent at lag ve for the
overall model.
Long{run total eects
16The specications in Table 4 allow us to calculate the total eects of DIC membership
after one, two, three etc. years as explained in Subsection 5.3. We display the results of
such a calculation in Table 5. It shows that the number of patent applications increases
by 1.615 percent in total due to DIC participation three years after a DIC had been
joined, an eect that is statistically signicant at the four percent marginal signicance
level. The total eect is with 1.337 percent somewhat smaller for innovative rms prior
to treatment. For large rms we do not nd any statistically signicant total eects.
We do not provide evidence for any statistically signicant eects of treatment
on employment either, at least if rms are considered overall. This is dierent for
innovative rms where we estimate a statistically weakly signicant eect of 0.13
percent after ve years. After four years we nd an eect of 0.156 percent, statistically
signicant at the two percent marginal signicance level. Large rms again appear
not to be aected by treatment in terms of employment.
Neither do we report any statistically signicant total eects of DIC participation
on value added (or labor productivity).
8 Conclusion
While there exists a substantial body of literature on the eects of either research
subsidies, research joint ventures or public/private partnerships on innovative in{ and
outputs, much less is known about \hybrid" forms of research support schemes that
combine all three innovation policy measures such as the Danish Innovation Consortia
(DIC) which are in the focus of our study. Until 2002, the program covered 80 DICs
and included 274 unique rms. Total grant size was around 766 mio. DKK (about
100 mio. Euros). Each DIC consisted of at least one public research partner and
one industrial partner. Government reimbursed the public research partner for the
expenses it incurred to conduct the research.
Our data identify 220 of the 274 of the participating industrial partners and we
are able to merge this information to balance sheet data for the years 1990 to 2007.
We hence have a comparatively long panel data set at our disposal that we use to (i)
conduct conditional dierence-in- dierence analysis to generate estimates of causal
eects of treatment and to (ii) consider lagged eects of past DIC participation on
rm performance.
To solve the fundamental identication problem inherent in such analyzes we rst
match treatment rms (DIC members) and control rms (non DIC members) based
on their observed characteristics. We then estimate performance equations in rst
dierences, thereby eectively removing any time{invariant rm characteristics. We
consider three dierent types of performance variables, patent counts as a very di-
17rect measure of performance as well as employment and value added growth as more
indirect measures.
Given the time series dimension of our data we are able to account for lagged
DIC participation eects. We allow participation eects to materialize for up to ve
years after a DIC was joined. The average duration of a DIC is 3.5 years. We also
distinguish between \innovative" rms | rm that applied for at least one patent one
year prior to DIC participation | and \large" rms, rms that belonged to the 25
percent largest rms prior to treatment.
Our main ndings are as follows: DIC participation has a statistically and eco-
nomically signicant eect on the number of patent applications per year. The eects
appear both instantaneously and with lags of up to three years. The total eect of
DIC participation after three years is 0.439 percent (which needs to be compared to
an average number of patent applications per year of 0.586). That eect is primarily
driven by rms that innovated already before joining a DIC. By contrast, rms that
did not innovate before do not seem to be associated with gains from DIC participa-
tion. Likewise, we do not nd statistically signicant eects of DIC participation on
patenting for large rms. We also show that previous patenting enhances the proba-
bility of DIC participation and demonstrate that rm size and DIC participation are
positively related. The latter result calls into question governments' selection of rms
into treatment while the former nding reassures it.
We do not nd contemporaneous eects of program participation on employment
but show that DIC members' employment grows 0.025 percent faster in the year after
a DIC was joined compared to non{participating rms. For innovative rms the
corresponding eect is more than twice as large. Employment eects are largest for
innovative rms four year after a DIC is joined. The total DIC eect for those rms
is 0.156 percent. We do not nd any statistically signicant eects on employment for
large rms.
Finally, our estimates do not suggest any statistically signicant relationship be-
tween DIC participation and value added.
Our results hence indicate that subsidized public-private research partnership has
positive eects on direct outcome measures such as patent counts. It also impacts
employment growth positively. The latter eect is, however, more pertinent for rms
that were innovative already prior to joining a DIC. Governments may hence want to
focus support to already innovative rms when it comes to subsidy schemes of the type
we study. By contrast, we not nd evidence for DIC participation to aect large rms
in a statistical or economically signicant way. Future work may want to elaborate
further on this nding since governmental support often | and indeed in the present
18case | depends positively on rm size.




Mean Sd. Dev. Mean Sd. Dev. Mean Sd. Dev.
Outcome variables
Patent stock 0.0080 0.5125 0.0066 0.4293 1.2922 8.2788
Annual patent applications 0.0056 0.3499 0.0046 0.3044 0.9078 5.0845
# employees 13.5 130.0 12.8 119.9 576.1 1395.4
Prots (in 1,000) 57.6 12,300.0 57.0 12,300.0 531.9 1,891.6
Explanatory variables
Patent stockt 1 0.0081 0.5975 0.0067 0.4516 1.2812 11.6333
Dummy for patent at t   1 0.0074 0.0857 0.0071 0.0842 0.2350 0.4250
Firm age 12.9 15.3 12.9 15.2 35.7 36.7
Stock listed 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.3
Private company 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.2
Time until leakage 34.9 1.4 34.9 1.4 35.1 3.5
Patent eectiveness 4.5 0.1 4.5 0.1 4.5 0.4
Sales concentration 0.0681 0.1127 0.0679 0.1120 0.3027 0.2859
# obs. 193,037 192,820 217
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of our explanatory variables (before matching). Additional descriptive
statistics are shown in Appendix A and Appendix B.
20Table 2: Probit estimation results | probability of DIC membership
Coe. p{val.
ln(patent stock)t 1 0.041 0.017
Dummy for patent at t   1 0.848 0.000
Firm age 0.001 0.181
Stock listed 0.157 0.295
Private company -0.376 0.028
Time until leakage 0.003 0.927
Patent eectiveness -0.096 0.802
ln(# empl.) -0.012 0.819
ln(# empl.)2 0.035 0.000
Sales concentration 0.832 0.001
Tests for joint signicance
Past patenting 78.93 0.000







Table 2 displays Probit estimation results for the probability to be a member of an DIC . The specication also
contains a set of legal form dummies, region dummies, and year dummies. It involves 193,037 observations on
27,798 unique rms.
21Table 3: cDID estimation results: contemporaneous eects only
All Innovative Large
rms rms rms
Coe. p{val. Coe. p{val. Coe. p{val.
Dependent variable: patent stock
Dummy patent application t   1 0.006 0.031 0.007 0.035 0.003 0.353
ln(# empl.) 0.280 0.002 0.255 0.002 0.174 0.214
Sales concentration -1.805 0.020 -1.873 0.033 -0.162 0.850
Treatment 0.387 0.052 0.383 0.073 0.099 0.716
Tests for joint signicance
Correlated eects 120.38 0.00 25.16 0.00 67.58 0.00
Year dummies 4.61 0.80 5.12 0.74 18.06 0.02
# obs. 3,776 989 1,117
# rms 390 116 126
Dependent variable: ln(employment)
Dummy patent application t   1 0.003 0.361 0.003 0.375 0.003 0.478
ln(# empl.) 0.078 0.005 0.087 0.006 0.059 0.153
Sales concentration 0.140 0.011 0.147 0.216 0.400 0.001
Treatment 0.000 0.991 0.023 0.406 -0.019 0.381
Tests for joint signicance
Fixed eects 1.82 0.00 2.30 0.00 2.16 0.00
Patent stock variables 4.05 0.02 3.81 0.02 1.04 0.35
Year dummies 8.25 0.00 3.09 0.00 5.61 0.00
# obs. 4,549 1,218 1,363
# rms 387 115 125
Dependent variable: ln(gross prots)
Dummy patent application t   1 0.004 0.934 0.040 0.420 0.000 0.998
ln(# empl.) 0.165 0.000 0.114 0.000 0.097 0.000
Sales concentration 0.002 0.983 0.024 0.900 0.179 0.324
Treatment 0.009 0.693 -0.027 0.530 -0.015 0.648
Tests for joint signicance
Fixed eects 0.98 0.61 1.16 0.13 1.41 0.00
Patent stock variables 0.68 0.51 1.03 0.36 0.42 0.66
Year dummies 4.57 0.00 2.93 0.00 2.58 0.01
# obs. 4,053 1,100 1,229
# rms 371 110 121
Table 3 displays conditional dierence{in{dierence estimation for the eects of treatment on the three outcome
variables number of patent applications per year, the natural logarithm of employment and the natural logarithm
of gross prot. The estimated treatment eects are to be interpreted as percentage changes in the outcome variable
due to treatment. The regressions for employment and gross prots are estimated by linear xed eects, the
patent applications equation is estimated by negative binomial regressions. All estimations are in rst dierences.
We discard the one percent observations with lowest and highest growth in gross prots and employment growth
respectively. Our patent count estimations consist of fewer observations since our patent data ends in 2004. The
tests for joint signicance of the \correlated eects" variables correspond to the correlated eects proxy and zero
ination variables suggested by Blundell et al. (1995). \Innovative rms" are those with a positive patent stock
the year before treatment. \Large rms" are rms that belonged to the 25 percent largest ones the year before
treatment.
22Table 4: cDiD estimation results: lagged eects
All Innovative Large
rms rms rms
Coe. p{val. Coe. p{val. Coe. p{val.
Dependent variable: patent stock
Patent stock t   1 0.009 0.002 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.307
ln(# empl.) 0.306 0.001 0.275 0.001 0.188 0.168
Sales concentration -2.080 0.010 -2.063 0.026 0.091 0.922
Treatmentt 0.440 0.035 0.420 0.054 0.196 0.520
Treatmentt   1 0.354 0.046 0.268 0.095 0.203 0.322
Treatmentt   2 0.383 0.038 0.259 0.159 -0.080 0.652
Treatmentt   3 0.439 0.037 0.389 0.092 0.385 0.104
Treatmentt   4 -0.779 0.056 -0.657 0.079 -0.227 0.573
Treatmentt   5 0.253 0.406 0.247 0.400 0.328 0.420
Tests for joint signicance
Treatment dummies 10.82 0.09 8.11 0.23 5.93 0.43
Correlated eects 130.33 0.00 31.00 0.00 65.52 0.00
Year dummies 4.16 0.84 4.28 0.83 8.08 0.43
Dependent variable: ln(employment)
ln(patent stock)t 1 0.003 0.354 0.003 0.320 0.004 0.449
Dummy patent stock t   1 > 0 0.074 0.007 0.077 0.016 0.059 0.157
Sales concentration 0.140 0.011 0.156 0.191 0.396 0.001
Treatmentt 0.002 0.900 0.033 0.256 -0.032 0.163
Treatmentt   1 0.025 0.067 0.057 0.023 -0.011 0.596
Treatmentt   2 0.002 0.858 0.002 0.947 0.021 0.291
Treatmentt   3 -0.006 0.674 0.005 0.861 -0.003 0.876
Treatmentt   4 0.008 0.616 0.059 0.041 -0.022 0.322
Treatmentt   5 -0.002 0.895 -0.017 0.610 -0.045 0.088
Tests for joint signicance
Treatment dummies 0.68 0.67 1.72 0.11 0.98 0.44
Fixed eects 1.80 0.00 2.26 0.00 2.17 0.00
Patent stock variables 3.60 0.03 2.93 0.05 1.03 0.36
Year dummies 7.73 0.00 2.76 0.01 5.40 0.00
Dependent variable: ln(gross prots)
ln(patent stock)t 1 0.006 0.274 0.008 0.157 0.006 0.404
Dummy patent stock t   1 > 0 0.007 0.880 0.039 0.439 -0.002 0.978
ln(employment) 0.165 0.000 0.112 0.000 0.096 0.000
Sales concentration -0.006 0.951 0.015 0.938 0.168 0.357
Treatmentt -0.004 0.853 -0.040 0.392 -0.024 0.497
Treatmentt   1 -0.019 0.390 -0.009 0.819 -0.015 0.640
Treatmentt   2 0.009 0.671 0.021 0.627 0.034 0.290
Treatmentt   3 -0.028 0.210 -0.009 0.833 -0.019 0.555
Treatmentt   4 -0.006 0.825 0.025 0.598 -0.004 0.900
Treatmentt   5 -0.056 0.051 -0.074 0.165 -0.036 0.382
Tests for joint signicance
Treatment dummies 0.98 0.44 0.53 0.79 0.45 0.84
Fixed eects 0.98 0.59 1.16 0.14 1.41 0.00
Patent stock variables 0.63 0.53 1.03 0.36 0.41 0.67
Year dummies 4.16 0.00 2.80 0.00 2.46 0.01
Table 4 displays conditional dierence{in{dierence estimation for the eects of treatment on the three outcome
variables number of patent applications per year, the natural logarithm of employment and the natural logarithm
of gross prot accounting for ve lags of the treatment variable. All estimations are in rst dierences. The
specications are otherwise identical with those shown in Table 3.
23Table 5: Total long{run eects of DIC membership
All Innovative Large
Lag rms rms rms
length Eect p{val. Coe. p{val. Coe. p{val.
Dependent variable: patent stock
0 0.440 0.035 0.420 0.054 0.196 0.520
1 0.794 0.024 0.688 0.041 0.399 0.388
2 1.176 0.011 0.947 0.029 0.319 0.524
3 1.615 0.004 1.337 0.015 0.704 0.223
4 0.836 0.204 0.679 0.264 0.477 0.450
5 1.090 0.206 0.926 0.237 0.806 0.378
Dependent variable: ln(employment)
0 0.002 0.900 0.033 0.256 -0.032 0.163
1 0.027 0.205 0.090 0.025 -0.042 0.184
2 0.029 0.260 0.092 0.063 -0.021 0.585
3 0.023 0.441 0.097 0.095 -0.024 0.589
4 0.031 0.395 0.156 0.025 -0.047 0.388
5 0.028 0.526 0.139 0.101 -0.091 0.168
Dependent variable: ln(gross prots)
0 -0.004 0.853 -0.040 0.392 -0.024 0.497
1 -0.024 0.497 -0.049 0.450 -0.039 0.438
2 -0.014 0.738 -0.028 0.726 -0.005 0.939
3 -0.042 0.391 -0.037 0.693 -0.024 0.741
4 -0.048 0.419 -0.012 0.914 -0.028 0.741
5 -0.104 0.154 -0.087 0.525 -0.065 0.539
Table 5 \total" long{run eects of DIC participation on our outcome variables. The gures are to be interpreted
as percentage change in the outcome variables after 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 years after a DIC was joined. The calculation
of these eects is based on results Table 4. The derivation of the long{run total eects is shown in Subsection 5.3.
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Copenhagen  0.008 0.512 0.007 0.429 1.292 8.279
Number of patents per year 0.006 0.350 0.005 0.304 0.908 5.085
Number of employees 13.452 129.967 12.819 119.886 576.111 1,395.354
Value added 57,599 12,300,000 57,010 12,300,000 531,906 1,891,617
Patent stock at t‐1 0.008 0.597 0.007 0.452 1.281 11.633
Positive patent stock at t‐1 0.007 0.086 0.007 0.084 0.235 0.425
Firm age 12.918 15.310 12.892 15.250 35.687 36.690
Stock listed 0.365 0.482 0.365 0.481 0.908 0.290
Private company 0.608 0.488 0.609 0.488 0.055 0.229
Time until leakage 34.915 1.377 34.915 1.372 35.060 3.541
Patent effectiveness 4.549 0.144 4.549 0.144 4.477 0.363
Sales concentration 0.068 0.113 0.068 0.112 0.303 0.286
Manufacturing I 0.090 0.286 0.090 0.286 0.060 0.238
Manufacturing II 0.047 0.212 0.047 0.211 0.290 0.455
Manufacturing III 0.017 0.128 0.017 0.128 0.157 0.364
Electricity, gas and water supply;  0.057 0.232 0.057 0.233 0.046 0.210
   Construction
Wholesale and retail trade;  0.115 0.318 0.115 0.318 0.147 0.355
   Repair; Hotels and restaurants
Transport, storage and communication;  0.386 0.487 0.386 0.487 0.055 0.229
   Financial intermediation
Real estate, renting and business activities 0.232 0.422 0.232 0.422 0.217 0.413
Education; Health and social work 0.057 0.232 0.057 0.232 0.028 0.164
Copenhagen  0.020 0.142 0.020 0.141 0.074 0.262
Frederiksberg 0.363 0.481 0.363 0.481 0.382 0.487
Helsingør 0.088 0.283 0.088 0.283 0.069 0.254
Roskilde 0.069 0.254 0.069 0.254 0.065 0.246
Odense 0.066 0.248 0.066 0.248 0.041 0.200
Kolding 0.053 0.225 0.053 0.225 0.074 0.262
Fredericia 0.097 0.296 0.097 0.296 0.078 0.269
Aarhus 0.172 0.378 0.172 0.378 0.157 0.364 Aarhus 0.172 0.378 0.172 0.378 0.157 0.364
Aalborg 0.071 0.257 0.071 0.257 0.060 0.238









Patent stock at t 0.977 5.863 0.812 4.997 5.420 16.528
Number of patents per year 0.648 3.993 0.532 3.537 3.784 10.023
Number of employees 113.905 382.668 90.876 236.667 736.137 1,493.350
Value added 92,903 472,669 66,802 212,909 769,456 2,109,031
Patent stock at t‐1 1.095 6.860 0.934 5.262 5.451 23.695
Positive patent stock at t‐1 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Firm age 19.441 23.250 18.797 21.990 36.843 42.443
Stock listed 0.735 0.442 0.728 0.445 0.922 0.272
Private company 0.258 0.437 0.266 0.442 0.020 0.140
Time until leakage 35.016 1.930 35.005 1.829 35.314 3.760
Patent effectiveness 4.527 0.182 4.528 0.169 4.479 0.397
Sales concentration 0.176 0.211 0.168 0.204 0.387 0.289
Manufacturing I 0.031 0.173 0.030 0.170 0.059 0.238
Manufacturing II 0.220 0.415 0.216 0.412 0.333 0.476
Manufacturing III 0.088 0.284 0.081 0.272 0.294 0.460
Electricity, gas and water supply;  0.031 0.173 0.032 0.176 0.000 0.000
   Construction
Wholesale and retail trade;  0.114 0.318 0.117 0.321 0.039 0.196
   Repair; Hotels and restaurants
Transport, storage and communication;  0.115 0.320 0.118 0.322 0.059 0.238
   Financial intermediation
Real estate, renting and business activities 0.323 0.468 0.327 0.469 0.216 0.415
Education; Health and social work 0.078 0.268 0.081 0.272 0.000 0.000
Copenhagen  0.010 0.099 0.009 0.093 0.039 0.196
Frederiksberg 0.373 0.484 0.371 0.483 0.431 0.500
Helsingør 0.140 0.347 0.142 0.349 0.098 0.300
Roskilde 0.059 0.237 0.059 0.235 0.078 0.272
Odense 0.067 0.250 0.067 0.251 0.059 0.238
Kolding 0.052 0.222 0.052 0.221 0.059 0.238
Fredericia 0.098 0.297 0.101 0.301 0.020 0.140
Aarhus 0 141 0 349 0 141 0 348 0 157 0 367 Aarhus 0.141 0.349 0.141 0.348 0.157 0.367
Aalborg 0.059 0.237 0.060 0.237 0.059 0.238
# obs. 1,429 1,378 51Large firms prior to treatment
All Untreated Treated
Patent stock at t 0.029 1.056 0.229 0.563 1.547 9.073
Number of patents per year 0.021 0.719 0.115 0.461 1.094 5.567
Number of employees 52.404 265.119 1.690 2.055 694.083 1,505.784
Value added 48,395 489,447 7,250 46,465 635,537 2,065,179
Patent stock at t‐1 0.030 1.232 0.379 0.754 1.507 12.765
Positive patent stock at t‐1 0.018 0.133 1.000 0.000 0.244 0.431
Firm age 19.426 22.887 11.437 11.894 39.394 37.440
Stock listed 0.696 0.460 0.545 0.498 0.939 0.240
Private company 0.254 0.435 0.451 0.498 0.022 0.148
Time until leakage 34.808 2.280 35.159 1.455 35.017 3.854
Patent effectiveness 4.534 0.221 4.558 0.152 4.461 0.390
Sales concentration 0.093 0.143 0.139 0.183 0.330 0.292
Manufacturing I 0.077 0.266 0.010 0.098 0.072 0.260
Manufacturing II 0.112 0.315 0.133 0.340 0.328 0.471
Manufacturing III 0.033 0.179 0.055 0.229 0.161 0.369
Electricity, gas and water supply;  0.091 0.288 0.019 0.138 0.044 0.207
   Construction
Wholesale and retail trade;  0.172 0.378 0.094 0.292 0.150 0.358
   Repair; Hotels and restaurants 0.259 0.438 0.170 0.376 0.033 0.180
Transport, storage and communication; 
   Financial intermediation 0.198 0.399 0.430 0.496 0.200 0.401
Real estate, renting and business activities 0.057 0.233 0.088 0.283 0.011 0.105
Education; Health and social work
Copenhagen  0.021 0.142 0.021 0.144 0.061 0.240
Frederiksberg 0.360 0.480 0.317 0.466 0.378 0.486
Helsingør 0.076 0.264 0.174 0.379 0.078 0.269
Roskilde 0.066 0.248 0.042 0.201 0.056 0.230
Odense 0.065 0.247 0.054 0.225 0.044 0.207
Kolding 0.057 0.232 0.041 0.197 0.078 0.269
Fredericia 0.110 0.313 0.084 0.278 0.083 0.277
Aarhus 0.169 0.375 0.183 0.387 0.156 0.363
Aalborg 0.076 0.265 0.084 0.278 0.067 0.250
# obs. 45,112 44,932 180Appendix B: descriptive statistics of all variables involved in the estimations
Mean Std. dev. 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% # obs.
Manufacturing I 21.0 145.4 1349 2 7 10,389
Manufacturing II 37.5 169.1 2 5 10 26 67 8,246
Manufacturing III 33.9 143.1 1 3 8 21 67 2,886
Electricity gas and water supply; 24 2 140 5 1 3 6 15 35 9 169 Electricity, gas and water supply;  24.2 140.5 1 3 6 15 35 9,169
   Construction
Wholesale and retail trade;  19.4 84.9 1 2 6 14 35 18,819
   Repair; Hotels and restaurants
Transport, storage and communication;  17.8 222.5 1239 2 4 37,106
   Financial intermediation
Real estate, renting and business activities 16.8 92.9 1239 2 5 29,480





   rubber and plastic products; other non‐metallic mineral products; basic metals and fabricated metal products;  p p; p; p;
   machinery and equipment n.e.c.
Manufacturing III: Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment; transport equipment; other manufacturing.Appendix C: standardized biases before and after matching
Mean Mean Bias
treated control (in perc.) p{val.
ln(patent stock)t 1 Unmatched -0.406 -0.037 -23.2 0.000
Matched -0.406 -0.489 5.3 0.711
ln(patent stock)2
t 1 Unmatched 4.741 0.435 24.0 0.000
Matched 4.741 6.591 -10.3 0.404
Dummy for patent at t   1 Unmatched 0.235 0.007 74.4 0.000
Matched 0.235 0.277 -13.5 0.323
Firm age Unmatched 35.687 12.892 81.1 0.000
Matched 35.687 37.124 -5.1 0.688
Stock listed Unmatched 0.908 0.365 136.7 0.000
Matched 0.908 0.885 5.8 0.432
Private company Unmatched 0.055 0.609 -145.2 0.000
Matched 0.055 0.074 -4.8 0.436
Time until leakage Unmatched 35.060 34.915 5.4 0.122
Matched 35.060 35.014 1.7 0.893
Patent eectiveness Unmatched 4.477 4.549 -25.9 0.000
Matched 4.477 4.492 -5.4 0.665
ln(# empl.) Unmatched 4.600 1.581 179.1 0.000
Matched 4.600 4.619 -1.2 0.925
ln(# empl.)2 Unmatched 25.578 3.741 153.4 0.000
Matched 25.578 26.327 -5.3 0.704
Sector dummies
Sales concentration Unmatched 0.303 0.068 108.2 0.000
Matched 0.303 0.289 6.6 0.591
Agriculture, shing, quarrying Unmatched 0.060 0.090 -11.5 0.121
Matched 0.060 0.055 1.8 0.837
Manufacturing Unmatched 0.290 0.047 68.7 0.000
Matched 0.290 0.281 2.6 0.832
Electricity, gas and water supply Unmatched 0.157 0.017 51.3 0.000
Matched 0.157 0.120 13.5 0.267
Construction Unmatched 0.046 0.057 -5.1 0.475
Matched 0.046 0.060 -6.2 0.521
Wholesale & retail trade; hotels, restaurants Unmatched 0.147 0.115 9.8 0.128
Matched 0.147 0.171 -6.8 0.513
Transport, post and telecommunications Unmatched 0.055 0.386 -86.9 0.000
Matched 0.055 0.060 -1.2 0.837
Public and personal services Unmatched 0.028 0.057 -14.6 0.062
Matched 0.028 0.051 -11.5 0.217
35Mean Mean Bias
treated control (in perc.) p{val.
Region dummies
Copenhagen Unmatched 0.074 0.020 25.3 0.000
Matched 0.074 0.060 6.6 0.565
Northern Sealand Unmatched 0.069 0.088 -6.9 0.334
Matched 0.069 0.060 3.4 0.697
Western Sealand Unmatched 0.065 0.069 -1.9 0.782
Matched 0.065 0.097 -12.9 0.218
Funen Unmatched 0.041 0.066 -10.8 0.149
Matched 0.041 0.060 -8.2 0.383
Southern Jutland Unmatched 0.074 0.053 8.4 0.180
Matched 0.074 0.046 11.3 0.226
Mid Jutland Unmatched 0.078 0.097 -6.6 0.353
Matched 0.078 0.092 -4.9 0.607
Aarhus area Unmatched 0.157 0.172 -4.2 0.543
Matched 0.157 0.129 7.5 0.412
Northern Jutland Unmatched 0.060 0.071 -4.5 0.524
Matched 0.060 0.055 1.9 0.837
Year dummies
Year 1995 Unmatched 0.078 0.093 -5.2 0.458
Matched 0.078 0.092 -4.9 0.607
Year 1996 Unmatched 0.106 0.094 4.1 0.530
Matched 0.106 0.078 9.2 0.321
Year 1997 Unmatched 0.189 0.095 27.2 0.000
Matched 0.189 0.157 9.3 0.375
Year 1998 Unmatched 0.106 0.100 1.8 0.786
Matched 0.106 0.074 10.6 0.241
Year 1999 Unmatched 0.253 0.110 37.7 0.000
Matched 0.253 0.272 -4.9 0.664
Year 2000 Unmatched 0.074 0.126 -17.4 0.021
Matched 0.074 0.111 -12.3 0.185
Year 2001 Unmatched 0.051 0.140 -30.6 0.000
Matched 0.051 0.065 -4.8 0.538
Year 2002 Unmatched 0.060 0.150 -29.7 0.000
Matched 0.060 0.060 0.0 1.000
Appendix C displays descriptive statistics of our explanatory variables before and after matching.
The p{values correspond to tests for identity in means of the respective variables.
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